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TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION IN
CYBERSPACE: CAN THESE LAWS DETER
"BAITING" PRACTICES ON WEB SITES?
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet' and the World Wide Web2 are areas where
claims of trademark infringement are becoming increasingly
common.3 It is important that trademark law keep up with
Internet technology so trademarks continue to identify the
source of goods and services to consumers.4 To keep up with
Internet technology, trademark law must adapt to police new
trademark uses that lead to consumer confusion and trade-
mark dilution.5 While there are many ways to infringe a
trademark, this comment focuses on a web site marketing
practice that will be referred to as search engine "baiting"
with trademarks.6
1. The Internet is a worldwide computer network of approximately
100,000 networks. There are more and more users accessing the Internet eve-
ryday, and the total number of users is over 35 million worldwide. Currently it
is comprised of approximately seven million computers that are all intercon-
nected via modems and other common communication technology. The Internet
has no central governing body, law, country, or organization. It was created as
a project by the Department of Defense, which has now expanded to include
almost everything imaginable, including commercial enterprises. American
Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (Jun. 26, 1997).
2. The World Wide Web, more commonly known as "www," "is a nickname
for a collection of information resources (both commercial and noncommercial)
available on the Internet using a protocol known as 'http."' THOMAS J.
SMEDINGHOFF, ONLINE LAW: THE SPA'S LEGAL GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS ON
THE INTERNET § 13.1, at 209-10 (The Software Publishers Ass'n 1996).
3. See Daniel A. Tysver, Bitlaw: Trademark Law Infringement (visited
Oct. 15, 1998) <http://www.bitlaw.com/trademark/infringe.html>.
4. See infra Part II.B. (explaining that the purpose of trademark law is to
identify the source of goods or services to the consumer).
5. One recent adaptation to trademark law is the Federal Trademark Di-
lution Act of 1995. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (West 1996); see also infra Part II.B.
(discussing how trademark law infringement is principled on consumer confu-
sion).
6. While this comment may refer to domain names, generally the domain
name problem will not be addressed. For a list of domain name disputes, please
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Baiting occurs when a webmaster tricks a search engine
into indexing his web site when keywords are entered in a
search request.! Baiting can be accomplished by inserting
keywords into meta keyword tags,8 inserting keywords into
meta description tags,9 and inserting text into the back-
ground of the web site.' ° Adding certain keywords onto the
web site effectively puts "bait on the hook." That "bait" is
then discovered by search engines and indexed." Then when
a user searches for that keyword, the search engine will re-
turn an index with that site listed.'2 Trademark infringe-
ment arguably occurs when those keywords are someone
else's trademarks and they are used to bait the search engine
into indexing the web site.
This problem is more easily understood by looking at a
hypothetical business example. Suppose a hypothetical book
selling business, Mythic Books Inc., has finally succeeded in
the tough Internet market.'" Mythic BooksTM is now well
known in the book selling business for the quality and speedy
delivery of their books. A real breakthrough for Mythic
Books occurred with the development of a web site that mar-
kets Mythic Books. The web site, Mythicbooks.com, brought
Mythic Books TM into the public eye and the proof is in the
large number of visits and orders the web site receives."
Mythicbooks.com features a price list, order forms, drawings,
and descriptions of the books, as well as links to other helpful
book sites on the web.
15
Mythic Books Inc. is well on its way to becoming a suc-
cessful business when the sales of Mythic Books take a sig-
nificant plunge. The web site is receiving only half of the
number of visits it used to, and the orders of Mythic Books
refer to a list maintained by Georgetown University available at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu.html.
7. See infra Part II.A.1. (discussing how search engines work and the dif-
ferent types of search engines).
8. See infra Part II.A. 1. (defining meta keyword tags).
9. See infra Part II.A.1. (defining meta description tags).
10. See infra Part II.A.2. (defining baiting via background text).
11. See infra Part II.A. 1. (describing how search engines work).
12. See infra Part II.A.1. (describing how search engines work).
13. Mythic Books Inc. and Mythic BooksTM are fictitious and created exclu-
sively for illustrative purposes. Any relation to an actual company or trade-
mark is completely accidental and purely for educational purposes only.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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are down considerably. There are no significant market fac-
tors to explain this sudden downturn, and Mythic Books Inc.
is perplexed about the scarcity of sales. Mythic Books Inc.
initiates a web site search on Mythic BooksTM to see if its
trademark comes up on the search. 6 Alarmingly, ten other
web sites are indexed before its site Mythicbooks.com is in-
dexed in the search results.
Upon first glance, the trademark Mythic BooksTM does
not seem to be anywhere on the web sites in the search re-
sults. However, further investigation uncovers that within
the meta tags and background text of the ten web sites, there
are numerous instances where the trademark Mythic BooksTM
17
appears.
The use of Mythic Books trademarks in this manner by
other web sites directly impacts where Mythic BooksTM ap-
pears on the search engine index. 8 The other web sites'
baiting practices with the Mythic Books trademark cause the
other web sites to appear higher in the index or often on the
first page of search results. Consequently, they move
Mythicbooks.com down the search results list, often to the
second page of search results." Mythic Books Inc. consults
legal counsel to determine the likelihood of winning an action
against these web site owners because the name and lifeblood
of Mythic Books is on the line. An attorney informs Mythic
Books Inc. that there is very little case law directly on point
and it is uncertain whether trademark and unfair competi-
tion law can provide an adequate remedy."0
The uncertainty of the law in this area is mainly a result
16. See infra Part II.A. 1. (explaining how to do this web search).
17. See infra Part II.A.1.
18. See infra Part II.A. (explaining that other factors such as how the
search engine determines the keyword priority have some impact as well). See
also David Loundy, Hidden Code Sparks High-Profile Lawsuit, CHI. DAILY L.
BULL., Sept. 11, 1997, at 6.
19. See infra Part II.A. (describing how search engines index web sites).
20. If the courts were to follow the rulings in the following cases, Mythic
Books may be protected by trademark and unfair competition law. Playboy En-
terprises, Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, No. C-97-3204, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14346 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 1997), injunction granted, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14345 (Sept. 8, 1997); Oppedahl & Larson v. Advanced Concepts, No. 97-CV-
1592 (D. Colo. Dec. 19, 1997); Insituform Tech., Inc. v. Nat'l Envirotech Group
LLC, No. 97-2064 (E.D. La. Aug. 26, 1997); Playboy Enter., Inc. v. AsiaFocus
Int'l Inc., No. 97-734-A (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 1998). However, since those cases, a
case has come down that upholds the use of trademarked terms in meta tags.
See Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Welles, No. 98-CV-0413-K (JFS) (S.D. Cal. 1998).
2471998]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
of the fast growth of the Internet and the slow progression of
the law regulating it. 2 The cases that exist are based mostly
on domain name disputes, linking and jurisdictional prob-
lems arising with trademark and unfair competition law, not
baiting practices.22 Therefore, to get an adequate remedy for
Mythic Books Inc., they must embrace traditional trademark
and unfair competition law and apply it accordingly to fit
with the current Internet cases.23
There are currently five cases that deal with the trade-
mark-baiting practices of web site owners: Insituform Tech-
nologies v. National Envirotech Group;24 Oppedahl & Larson
v. Advanced Concepts; Playboy Enterprises v. Calvin De-
signer Label;26 Playboy Enterprises v. AsiaFocus;27 Playboy
Enterprises v. Welles. 2' The trend in these cases seems to be
for granting an injunction and ruling that baiting is trade-
mark or unfair competition infringement. 9 With the excep-
tion of the Welles case, these cases involve bad actors and do
not illustrate trademark use, class, geographic, or disclaimer
problems and, therefore, it is unclear how courts will deal
with claims involving these trademark problems." The
Welles case highlights the disclaimer and fair use problem."'
This comment first traces the development of trademark
and unfair competition law as it applies to traditional trade-
mark infringement.32 Secondly, a comparison of these tradi-
tional theories to the recent decisions in federal courts re-
21. This is evidenced by the fact that only two cases to date have decided on
this issue. Oppedahl & Larson, No. 97-CV-1592; Insituform, No. 97-2064.
22. See Shetland Times Ltd. v. Wills, Scot. Sess. Cas., (10/24/96) 1 EIPLR
723 (11/1/96); Ticketmaster Corp. v. Mircosoft Corp., (S.D. Cal. Complaint filed
Apr. 28, 1997; Washington Post v. Total News, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 1190 (PKL)
(S.D.N.Y. complaint filed Feb. 20, 1997).
23. See MARGRETH BARRETT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 76-80 (1996); SMEDINGHOFF, supra note 2, at 207-24.
24. Insituform, No. 97-2064.
25. Oppedahl & Larson, No. 97-CV-1592.
26. Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, No. C-97-3204, injunction
granted, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14345 (Sept. 8, 1997).
27. Playboy Enter., Inc. v. AsiaFocus Int'l Inc., No. 97-734-A (E.D. Va. April
10, 1998).
28. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, No. 98-CV-0413-K (JFS) (S.D. Cal.
1998).
29. See infra Part II.D.
30. See infra Part II.D.; See Oppedahl & Larson (visited Oct. 16, 1998)
<http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Lobby/6620/index.htm>.
31. Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Welles, No. 98-CV-0413-K (JFS) (S.D. Cal. 1998).
32. See infra Parts II., IV.
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garding trademark and unfair competition infringement re-
garding trademark-baiting practices will be discussed." This
will include a discussion of the particular problems raised by
the evolution of the Internet and search engines.34 It is ar-
gued that current trademark and unfair competition laws are
insufficient to adequately provide a trademark owner, vic-
timized by baiting practices on the Internet, with a proper
remedy. 5
This comment proposes that federal courts should con-
tinue to follow the trend set by Insituform,36 Oppedahl,7 Cal-
vin 8 and AsiaFocus.5 A system should be established that
would incorporate unfair competition and trademark law
with keyword meta tag use and regulate such use.4° Fur-
thermore, courts should apply current trademark and unfair
competition laws to the Internet so that trademark-baiting
practices can be clarified and properly resolved.4 Addition-
ally, owners of identical trademarks in different trademark
classes or geographic origins should be encouraged to cross-
link each other's web sites to eliminate confusion or trade-
mark dilution.42 Finally, this comment proposes that search
engines and other technology Internet companies should con-
tinue to develop technology that searches web sites in clear,
comprehensive styles, and encourage web sites to register
with them accordingly.43
II. BACKGROUND
In order to determine whether trademark and unfair
competition laws can effectively deter baiting practices on
33. See infra Parts II., IV.
34. See infra Parts II., IV.
35. See infra Part III.
36. Insituform Tech., Inc. v. Nat'l Envirotech Group LLC, No. 97-2064 (E.D.
La. Aug. 26, 1997).
37. Oppedahl & Larson v. Advanced Concepts, No. 97-CV-1592 (D. Colo.
Dec. 19, 1997).
38. Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, No. C-97-3204, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14346 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 1997), injunction granted, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 14345 (Sept. 8, 1997).
39. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. AsiaFocus Int'l Inc., No. 97-734-A (E.D. Va.
April 10, 1998).
40. See infra Part VI.
41. See infra Parts IV., V.
42. See infra Part VI.
43. See infra Part VI.
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web sites, they must be examined and applied to the Inter-
net. There are many intricacies to these laws, but this com-
ment will only examine the principles and cases that are
relevant to the issue of baiting practices with trademarks
and Internet search engines."
A. Search Engines
A search engine is a type of software that usually con-
sists of three components: a spider, an index and the search-
engine software.4 Common examples of search engines are
AltaVista, Excite, Infoseek and Lycos.4 These software spi-
ders, or robots, search the Internet and collect information
about web sites and index that information in huge data-
bases.47 To use these search engines to locate information the
user must type in keywords for the information he or she is
looking for.4 Then the search engine compares the keywords
to the huge database the spiders have created and gives the
user an index of web sites that contain that keyword.4
The benefits of search engines are that they provide us-
ers with a method of searching the vast Internet."° They are
quite comprehensive and can find specific topics that would
not normally be indexed." Furthermore, search engines are
often accessed at home from a personal computer so they of-
fer a convenient way for the user to find information, instead
of travelling to a library card catalog.
However, there are several disadvantages to using
search engines. First, there is no single entity that indexes
the Internet like the Library of Congress indexes books." No
44. There are border arguments, jurisdiction arguments, domain name ar-
guments, and type of use arguments. See generally SMEDINGHOFF, supra note
2, at 209-10.
45. JULIAN S. MILLSTEIN, ET AL., DOING BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET:
FORMS AND ANALYSIS 1-18 (Law Journal Seminars-Press, 1997).
46. AltaVista is available at http://www.altavista.digital.com, Excite is
available at http://www.excite.com, Infoseek is available at
http://www.infoseek.com, and Lycos is available at http://www.lycos.com.
47. Susan Stellin, Can You Trust Your Search Engine?, (visited Oct. 15,
1998) <http://www.cnet.com/Content/Features/Dlife/Search/index.html>.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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one search engine is a completely comprehensive index.5"
Search engines are far from perfect and often a user will have
to sort through piles of meaningless data to find what he or
she is looking for. 4 Additionally, no one search engine works
or indexes the same as another search engine.5" This is be-
cause each engine uses different proprietary software and al-
gorithms to prioritize the indexed material.56 Therefore, the
results from a keyword search with one search engine could
be completely different from the same keyword search on an-
other search engine.57 Finally, search engines can be baited
by webmasters to index web pages that have nothing to do
with the material the user is searching for.58
1. How Search Engines Work
There are a number of ways search engines determine
which web sites to list when a user initiates a search. While
there are many factors that ultimately determine how the list
is displayed, there are some factors that are generally taken
into account by most search engines.59 The difference in
search results from one search engine to another is mainly
due to the different weight each factor is given.6"
One factor is the web site's URL and domain name.6
Search engines that search fields of text, sounds, and images
will often look in the web site's domain name for the keyword
terms.62 However, simply because a web site address may
contain the keyword does not mean that it will contain in-
formation about that keyword. 3
53. See Stellin, supra note 47.
54. Id.
55. MILLSTEIN, ETAL., supra note 45, at 1-19.
56. Stellin, supra note 47.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. URL stands for Universal Resource Locator. This is a numerical
address like a phone number, which is used to identify the resource on the Web.
Then a name is given to it so it can be easily remembered. This type of name is
called a second level domain name. MILLSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 45 at 1-19,
G-4, G-12.
62. See Stellin, supra note 47; MILLSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 45, at 1-19.
63. Web sites are often named for people or for services that are not con-
tained within the web site. When the domain name is a trademark, this prob-
lem is known as the "Domain Name Dispute." Courtney Macavinta, CNET
NEWS.COM, WIPO Deals with Domain Disputes, July 10, 1998, (visited Oct. 16,
1998] 251
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
The title of the web page is another factor considered by
search engines.64 The title of a web page is determined by the
HTML programming <title><title/> tag.65 The webmaster en-
ters the title of the web page between the title tags.66 If a
search term is between the title tags (<title> search term
<title/>) then it is more likely that the search engine will in-
dex that web site. 7
Another factor is the actual text of the web site.68 Search
engines that use spiders actually retrieve the text of the web
pages they search. 9 One of the factors of full text search en-
gines is how often the search term appears on the web
pages."0 In theory, the more times the term appears, the
more likely that web site would appear above a web site that
contains less instances of that term.7'
The description of the web page is another factor consid-
ered by search engines. 2 Some search engines such as Excite
and Lycos generate their own descriptions of web sites while
other search engines such as AltaVista and Infoseek use an
HTML tag known as the description meta tag.73 Similar to
the title tag, the description meta tag enables the webmaster
to enter a description about the web site as the webmaster
did for the web page title. 4 If a search term is in the descrip-
tion meta tag it is more likely that the search engine will in-
dex that web site.7 However, unlike title tags, description
meta tags are not visible on the web site itself unless the
site's HTML source code is viewed.6
1998) <http://www.news.com/News/Itemi/0,4,24072,00.html?st.cn.nws.rl.ne>.
64. See Stellin, supra note 47.
65. HTML is the programming language used to display text and image
documents on the World Wide Web. See MILLSTEIN, ET AL., supra note 45, at
G-6; See Stellin, supra note 47 (discussing title tags).
66. Stellin, supra note 47.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. AltaVista, Excite, and InfoSeek are all examples of full text search
engines. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Stellin, supra note 47.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. For example, if Mythic Books Inc. wanted its own description of the
Mythic Books.com web site to appear in search engine listings, it would use the
meta description tag, like so: <META name = description content = Interna-
tionally renowned online book store contains millions of books of all topics. The
252 [Vol. 39
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The last, but in no way the least, factor generally taken
into account by most search engines is the keyword meta
tag." This meta tag enables the webmaster to influence how
search engines will rank the web site in a way similar to the
description meta tag." Webmasters use these keyword meta
tags for marketing and promoting web sites.79 Like the de-
scription meta tag, the keyword meta tag does not appear
anywhere on the web site.8" An added benefit of the keyword
meta tag is that it is not displayed in the search engine index
description either, so the user does not see this extra mar-
keting text unless the HTML source code is viewed.8
It is important to remember that each of these factors
weighs more or less heavily depending upon the search en-
gine.82 Furthermore, search engines continue to change their
ranking algorithms to gain more accuracy and relevancy for
users searching the web.83
2. "Baiting" Search Engines
Since there are always people who cheat the system, it is
no surprise that people trick search engines. One way
webmasters bait search engines is to fill their web pages with
terms "users most often search with" in the keyword meta
tag.84 The keyword meta tag is used because readers of the
web page do not see this material and because this tag was
designed to identify the keywords of the web page." This is
accomplished by repeating the same words over and over to
increase the chance that the page will be listed high in the
indexed search results.8"
Another way to bait search engines is to hide keywords
best online book store on the Web>.
77. See Stellin, supra note 47.
78. Id.
79. Id. For example, Mythic Books Inc. has decided to use the keyword
meta tag to influence how the Mythicbooks.com web site is ranked in search
engines: <META name = keywords content = book sale book sale magazine sale
magazine sale online store book store>.
80. See Stellin, supra note 47. The keyword meta tag can be viewed by
viewing the web site source code similar to the description meta tag. See id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See Stellin, supra note 47. To view a list of current keywords that are
used to search for web sites go to http://voyeur.mckinley.com/cgi-bin/voyeur.cgi.
85. See Stellin, supra note 47.
86. Id.
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in the text of the web page.87 To make the text invisible to
the reader, it is created in the same color as the web page's
background color.88 Webmasters insert thousands of words
into the background to bait the search spider into indexing
the web site on a search of those keywords.89
Not to be outdone, search engine designers battle back
against these baiting techniques.9 ° For example, Infoseek ig-
nores keywords that are repeated more than seven times.9
WebCrawler clears its index of web sites that use baiting
practices.92 Excite does not use keyword meta tags because
they are currently too unreliable.93 AltaVista only indexes
keywords in text up to 1,024 characters.94 However, webmas-
ters are sure to try to beat every new technique search en-
gines discover for evaluating web sites.
It is important to note that not all search engine trade-
mark-baiting is in an attempt to trick the search engine. A
majority of webmasters use title meta tags, description meta
tags, keyword meta tags, and background text to properly
alert a search engine to index their own web sites. As such,
the search engine is not fooled or tricked because the web site
actually contains the information and keywords that the
"bait" represents.
B. Trademark Law
With a foundation of search engines and baiting prac-
tices laid, it is important to understand what trademarks
are, the rights associated with trademarks, and which uses of
trademarks constitute infringement. A comprehensive un-
derstanding of trademark makes it clear that trademark-
baiting practices should constitute trademark infringement.
1. What Are Trademarks?
Trademarks allow consumers to identify and distinguish
87. Id.
88. Id. This is referred to as "black on black" or "white on white" text. Id.
89. See Doug Isenberg, Improper Use of 'Meta Tags' on Web Pages May
Cause Trademark Infringement and Dilution, BOARDWATCH, Feb. 1998, at 96-
98.
90. See Stellin, supra note 47.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See Isenberg, supra note 89, at 96-98.
94. See Stellin, supra note 47.
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the source and origin of goods and services in the market
place.9" The most common trademarks today come in many
different forms such as words and phrases, logos and slogans,
pictures and symbols, numerals and letters, abbreviations
and nicknames, colors, sounds, music, and Internet domain
names.96 One of the more commonly known forms of trade-
marks throughout the world today is a "brand name."97 An
example of a brand name trademark is Mythic BooksTM.
98
Mythic Books TM stands for Mythic Books Inc. and is the name
that their books are labeled with and marketed under.99 This
trademark allows consumers to identify the source of the
books through a consistent distinctive trademark.00 Con-
sumers associate trademarks with predictability of source
and consistency of product, enabling the consumer to make
choices between one product and another.'
In order for a brand name, symbol, logo, etc. to be recog-
nized and protected as a trademark, it must be inherently
distinctive or acquire distinctiveness through secondary
meaning.' 2 There are four basic categories for trademarks
that determine the strength of distinctiveness and trademark
status. O3 Those categories are arbitrary and fanciful marks,
suggestive marks, descriptive marks, and generic marks.'
Arbitrary, fanciful, and suggestive marks are deemed inher-
ently distinctive.' Descriptive marks can become trade-
marks if the marks acquire a secondary meaning."6 Generic
95. See J. THOMAS McCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 2 et seq. (3rd ed. 1996).
96. See SMEDINGHOFF, supra note 2, § 13.1, at209-10.
97. SMEDINGHOFF, supra note 2, at 209.
98. Mythic BooksTM is a fictitious company trademark. A real trademark
example is NikeTM .
99. Mythic BooksTM is the product trademark of Mythic Books Inc.
100. See BARRETT, supra note 23, at 81-84.
101. See SMEDINGHOFF, supra note 2, at 210.
102. See MCCARTHY, supra note 95, § 11.01[1] (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco
Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 120 (1992) (approving of the "classic formulation set
out by Judge Friendly" in Abercrombie & Fitch)). See Abercrombie & Fitch Co.
v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
103. MCCARTHY, supra note 95, § 11.01[1].
104. Id.
105. Id. "'Fanciful' marks consist of 'coined' words that have been invented
or selected for the sole purpose of functioning as a trademark." Id. at
§ 11.03[1] (citing Tisch Hotels, Inc. v. Americana Inn, Inc., 350 F.2d 609 (7th
Cir. 1965). An example of a fanciful mark is KodakTM.
106. Id. § 11.01[1]. "A mark is descriptive if it is describes the intended pur-
pose, function or use of the goods, the size of the goods, the class of users of the
1998] 255
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marks can never become trademarks."°7 However, it is im-
portant to note that the placement of a mark into one of these
categories is only one of many steps in determining the
strength of the trademark. °8
2. The Rights Associated with Trademarks
Trademarks are protectable under federal and state
law. °9 These laws provide the trademark owner with a right
to exclude others from unauthorized or confusing use of his
trademark or from using a trademark similar to his."0 The
Lanham Act provides protection against use of a trademark
on any product or service that could reasonably be thought by
the buying public to come from the same source as the
trademark owner's mark."' However, this right may not
cover trademark use in other classes of goods or geographic
regions and may not cover non-trademark uses, as defined
below.
Trademark classes are different categories of goods or
services that the trademark is used to distinguish."' The
same trademark can be by different owners used in different
classes because there is less likelihood for confusion. An ex-
ample is Domino sugar and Domino's Pizza. As long as the
consumer is not confused as to the source of the goods and/or
services because the consumer can distinguish the marks
goods, a desirable characteristic of the goods, the nature of the goods, or the
end effect upon the user." Id. § 11.04[2][a]. An example of a descriptive mark
is HEALTHY CHOICE TM for nutritious food products.
107. MCCARTHY, supra note 95, § 11.01[1]. "Generic marks are the names of
the goods or services themselves." JULIAN S. MILLSTEIN, ET AL., DOING
BUSINESS ON THE INTERNET: FORMS AND ANALYSIS, § 4.031l] (Law Journal
Seminars-Press 1997).
108. MCCARTHY, supra note 95, § 11.01(1].
109. The Trademark Act of 1946, also referred to as the Lanham Act pro-
vides federal protection for unauthorized and confusing use of trademarks. 15
U.S.C. 88 1051 et seq. State common law and statutory law also protect trade-
marks. See generally CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 14320 et seq.
110. Lanham Act § 32, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1114 (1). Federal and State laws rely
primarily on the same principles and therefore even though this comment fo-
cuses on Federal law, much of the analysis applies similarly to state law claims.
111. See MCCARTHY, supra note 95, § 24.03[2].
112. There are 34 classes for goods and eight classes for services and an al-
phabetical list of all the goods and services which comprises of approximately
11,000 items. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, GENERAL
INFORMATION BROCHURE (1997) 49; Nice Agreement Concerning the Interna-
tional Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration
of Marks (1959).
256 [Vol. 39
DETERING BAITING PRACTICES
based on the distinct trademark classes, a trademark owner
has no right to enjoin the use of the other trademark."3
Use of the same trademark in geographically separate
areas may be permissible because the trademarks identify
goods or services that are geographically remote from each
other and, therefore, the likelihood of consumer confusion is
diminished."' Therefore, a trademark owner has no right to
enjoin trademark use in another geographic region if his
trademark use does not extend to that region."' However,
the owner of a Principle Register trademark can enjoin a lo-
cal junior user if he can prove that his senior trademark will
expand into the geographic area."6
A trademark owner cannot enjoin use of the same or
similar trademark that is "non-trademark" use or
"comparative" use."7 Non-trademark use includes mere ref-
erence to a trademark that does not create any likelihood of
confusion,"8 fair descriptive use of a trademark,"9 and dic-
tionary reference use of a trademark. ° Comparative use or
comparative advertising use of a trademark may consist of a
mere reference to the trademark or a descriptive reference to
the trademark so long as it is truthful."' As long as the con-
sumer does not confuse the source of the goods or services be-
tween the trademarks compared, the trademark owner does
not have a right to enjoin the comparative use of his trade-
mark."'
113. See MCCARTHY, supra note 95, § 19.12[21[a].
114. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 95, § 26.00 et seq.
115. Id. (assuming that the local trademark does not represent itself as being
affiliated with the outside mark).
116. See MCCARTHY, supra note 95, § 26.13[1]. "Senior user is used herein to
designate the first seller to adopt and use a mark in the United States. Junior
user is used to designate the second seller to adopt the mark, even though the
junior user may be the first in time within a given remote territory."
Id. § 26.01[1]. The Principle Register is the collection of federally registered
trademarks under the Lanham Act. Id. § 19.00 et seq.
117. See SMEDINGHOFF, supra note 2, at 219.
118. Id. An example is an article listing computer products such as Compaq,
IBM, and Gateway 2000.
119. See SMEDINGHOFF, supra note 2, at 219.
120. Id. (using the word red in a sentence is not an infringement on RED
perfume).
121. Id. § 25.14.
122. Id.
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3. Infringing Trademark Use
To show trademark infringement the trademark owner
must prove consumer confusion of the source of goods or
services, unless the trademark is famous. 22 Statutory law for
trademark infringement provides: "using a mark that is the
same as or similar to the [the plaintiffs] trademark,... in
connection with the sale or advertising of goods or services,
and ... in a way that is likely to cause confusion as to the
source, origin, sponsorship, or approval of the goods or serv-
ices.'2 4
There are many factors under traditional trademark law
used to determine a likelihood of confusion. Some factors
weigh the similarity of the defendant's mark compared to the
plaintiffs trademark to determine whether a consumer is
likely to confuse the source of the product.16 Factors for de-
termining similarity are appearance, sound, meaning, mar-
keting channels, product or service, and purchasers. 27
Other factors for determining consumer confusion of the
source of the trademark are: actual evidence of consumer
confusion, the strength of the plaintiffs trademark, the de-
fendant's good faith in using the mark, and post sale confu-
sion."8 It is noteworthy that disclaimers are not typically
held to eliminate the likelihood for consumer confusion when
placed on a product. 19 This is because the disclaimer is gen-
erally so small that its effect is questionable.' Usually no
one single factor is conclusive, but a combination of factors
may show that a consumer is likely to confuse the product's
source and, therefore, that an infringement exists under
trademark law.'
4. Trademark Remedies
If the plaintiffs likelihood of success against the defen-
dant in a trademark infringement case is strong, or the in-
123. Id. § 23.00 et seq. Famous marks do not require consumer confusion.
See infra Part I.B.5.
124. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(a).
125. See MCCARTHY, supra note 95, § 23.03[1].
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See BARRETT, supra note 23, at 105.
130. Id.
131. Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 21, comment a (1995).
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jury to such plaintiff would be irreparable, courts may grant
a preliminary injunction against further trademark in-
fringement.3 2 Once infringement has been found, "a court
can issue an order (an injunction) forcing the infringer to stop
using the mark, conduct a remedial advertising campaign, or
take other action." 3' The court can also award the plaintiff
actual damages or profits from the defendant attributable to
the trademark use.' Furthermore, under the Lanham Act,
35
triple damages and/or attorneys fees may be awarded if the
owner has registered the trademark and provided notice.
However, these remedies are usually only awarded in excep-
tional cases.'3 7
5. Federal Trademark Dilution
A trademark owner is entitled to enjoin the use of his
trademark by another person under the dilution doctrine if
he can show that the use is dilutive, commercial, and that the
owner's trademark is famous.'38 Confusion of source is not a
necessary element for famous trademarks under the dilution
doctrine, whereas confusion of source is required to enjoin
another's use of a non-famous trademark. 9 This is an im-
portant distinction between trademark law and the trade-
mark dilution doctrine.
Dilutive trademark use is a weakening or reduction in
the ability of a trademark to clearly distinguish one source of
goods or services. 4 ° Dilution can occur in two different as-
pects, "Blurring" and "Tarnishment.""' Blurring occurs when
prospective customers see the plaintiffs trademark on a
number of different goods and services.' No confusion oc-
132. See BARRET, supra note 23, at 117.
133. See SMEDINGHOFF, supra note 2, at 222.
134. Id.
135. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. Trademark Act of 1946 as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1125c states the fol-
lowing: "The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled,.., to an injunction
against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name,
if such mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of
the mark." Id.
139. See MCCARTHY, supra note 95, § 24.13 [1][b].
140. Id. § 24.13 [1][a].
141. Id. §§ 24.13[1][a][i] - [ii].
142. Id. §§ 24.13[1][a][i]. Hypothetical examples of what might be dilution
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curs, but the unique and distinctive significance of the
trademark that distinguishes the one source is weakened.'
Tarnishment occurs when the unauthorized use of the
trademark degrades or lessens its distinctive quality.'"
Several factors are used to determine whether a trade-
mark is famous and, therefore, protected under the anti-
dilution statute: the degree of distinctiveness of the trade-
mark;"5 the duration of the use of the trademark; the dura-
tion of advertising and publicity of the trademark; the geo-
graphic extent of the trading area in which the trademark is
used;" 6 the channels of trade for the goods with which the
trademark is used; the degree of recognition of the trademark
in the trading areas by the trademark's owner and the person
against whom the injunction is sought; the extent of use of
the same or similar trademarks by third parties; and
whether the trademark was federally registered. "7  The
strength of these factors determines whether the mark is
protected but the analysis is not limited to these factors. 14
With an understanding of the limits of trademark law, it
is now important to understand what unfair competition law
is and the different causes of action that may be brought un-
der unfair competition law.
C. Unfair Competition
Unfair competition law has its roots in tort law, based on
deceit, trespass and conversion. "9 Unfair competition origi-
nated as state common law because of this tort law evolu-
tion,5 ° but since then Congress has codified these causes of
action in what is now known as the Lanham Act.' Two of
these causes of action are "passing off" and "false advertis-
by blurring are Dupont shoes, Buick aspirin, Kodak pianos, and Bulova gowns.
Id.
143. See MCCARTHY, supra note 95, § 24.13 [1][a][i].
144. Id. §§ 24.13[1][a][ii].
145. See trademark discussion on distinctiveness supra Part II.B.1.; Trade-
mark Act of 1946 as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1125c.1.
146. See trademark discussion on geographic regions supra Part III.B.2.;
Trademark Act of 1946 as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1125c.1.
147. Trademark Act of 1946 as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1125c.1.
148. See id.
149. See BARRETT, supra note 23, at 124.
150. Id.
151. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.
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ing." "' The current body of unfair competition rests in fed-
eral law, federal anti-dilution law, state common law, state
trade law, and a number of industry specific laws relating
trade names and labeling."'
1. What is Unfair Competition?
"The law of unfair competition is the umbrella for all
causes of action arising out of business conduct that is con-
trary to honest practice in industrial or commercial mat-
ters."'54 Unfair competition is one of the most flexible areas
of law because it has to evolve with the ever changing busi-
ness practices and uses of technology.' This is exemplified
in Judge Learned Hand's statement, "[t]here is no part of the
law which is more plastic than unfair competition, and what
was not recognized as an actionable wrong twenty-five years
ago may have become one today."5 6 Therefore, as new busi-
ness markets develop, like the Internet, this law should also
evolve to address the new techniques of improper conduct in
that marketplace.
2. False Identification of Origin, "Passing Off"
The Lanham Act prohibits the use of "false designations
of origin" in connection with goods, services, or their pack-
aging that are "likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or
to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activi-
ties."'57 "Passing off' occurs essentially when the defendant
makes some form of representation that causes the consumer
to believe that the defendant's goods come from or are affili-
ated with the plaintiff.'58
3. False Advertising Principles
The Lanham Act prohibits the use of a "false or mis-
leading description of fact, or false or misleading representa-
152. See id.
153. See SMEDINGHOFF, supra note 2, at 449.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 456.
156. See SMEDINGHOFF, supra note 2, at 456 (citing Ely Norris Safe Co. v.
Master Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1925); see also Electronic Data & Sales v.
Electronic Data Systems Corp., 954 F.2d 713 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
157. 15 U.S.C. § 1125.
158. See BARRETT, supra note 23, at 124.
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tion of fact" in commercial advertising or promotion, which
"misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geo-
graphic origin of... goods, services or commercial activi-
ties."' 9 The elements of a false advertising claim are:
(1) a defendant's false or misleading statement of fact in
advertising about its own product; (2) the statement actu-
ally deceived or had the capacity to deceive a substantial
segment of the audience; (3) the deception was material, in
that it was likely to influence the purchasing decision; (4)
the defendant caused its goods to enter interstate com-
merce; and (5) the plaintiff has been or is likely to be in-
jured as a result.160
The purpose of these elements is to protect the interests
of consumers by making it easier for competitors to enjoin
false advertising practices.'
With a firm understanding of search engines, trademark
law, and unfair competition law, it is now important to un-
derstand how the courts interpret these laws and apply them
to search engine baiting with trademarks.
D. Recent Cases
There are very few court decisions that specifically ad-
dress the trademark-baiting problem. 6 2 These early cases all
involve trademarks that are inserted into a competitor's meta
tag section of a web page.6 3 Furthermore, the trend in these
cases appears to be favoring the trademark owner and en-
joining the defendant's use of the trademark in his web meta
tags.' However, a new line of cases may emerge that would
not entitle the trademark owner to an injunction or damages
for fair or descriptive trademark use.
159. Trademark Act of 1946 as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1125a.
160. See BARRETT, supra note 23, at 132.
161. Id. at 133.
162. See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, No. C-97-3204,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14346 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 1997) (temporary restraining
order), injunction granted, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14345 (Sept. 8, 1997); Play-
boy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, No. 98-CV-0413-K (JFS) (S.D. Cal. 1998);
Oppedahl & Larson v. Advanced Concepts, No. 97-CV-1592 (D. Colo. Dec. 19,
1997); Insituform Technologies, Inc. v. National Envirotech Group LLC, No. 97-
2064 (E.D. La. Aug. 26, 1997); Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. AsiaFocus Interna-
tional Incorporated, No. 97-734-A (E.D. Vir. April 10, 1998); see supra Part I.
163. See infra part II.D.1-3.
164. See infra part II.D.1-3.
165. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, No. 98-CV-0413-K (JFS) (S.D. Cal.
262 [Vol. 39
DETERING BAITING PRACTICES
1. Insituform Technologies, Inc. v. National EnviroTech
Group, L.L.C.
The first case to come to a final judgment on these issues
was Insituform Technologies, Inc. v. National EnviroTech.'66
In Insituform, the plaintiff alleged that the insertion of the
registered trademarks, Insituform and Insitupipe, into the
meta tag section of the defendant's web site constituted an
infringement under federal unfair competition principles.67
The complaint alleged that because of this trademark use,
"databases maintained by various search engine companies
came to have an associative link between Insituform Tech-
nologies' trademarks and defendant's web site.' 68 Further-
more, the complaint alleged that because of this link,
"Internet users who searched 'Insituform' or 'Insitupipe' on
those search engines were presented with a list of matching
sites which included defendant's web site."'69
Following the principles of trademark and unfair compe-
tition, Insituform alleged that these acts by the defendant
constituted an infringement and passing off.' ° Insituform
argued that the defendants' conduct "was analogous to their
having altered a database maintained by the telephone com-
pany's Directory Assistance service; people calling "411" and
requesting the number for "Insituform" would be given de-
fendant's phone number instead."7'
Shortly after Insituform filed its preliminary injunction
motion the case was settled.'72 The defendant agreed to a fi-
nal judgment that directed defendant to delete the plaintiffs
trademarks from their meta tags, and prohibited the further
use of those trademarks by the defendant on any other web
sites.'' Additionally, the defendant was directed to "contact
specific search engine companies via e-mail and by letter to
notify the companies of the lawsuit's resolution and instruct
1998).
166. Insituform Technologies, Inc. v. National Envirotech Group LLC, No.
97-2064 (E.D. La. Aug. 26, 1997).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Insituform Technologies, Inc. v. National Envirotech Group LLC, No.
97-2064 (E.D. La. Aug. 26, 1997).
172. Id.
173. Id.
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the companies to delete the associate link in their databases
between Insituform and Insitupipe and the [defendant's] web
site. ,74
2. Oppedahl & Larson v. Advanced Concepts
Similar to Insituform, in Oppedahl v. Advanced Con-
cepts, the plaintiff alleged that the use of the plaintiffs
trademark of Oppedahl & Larson within the keyword meta
tag section of the defendants' web site constituted an in-
fringement under trademark principles and passing off based
on unfair competition principles.' 5 The complaint alleged
that the use of the plaintiffs mark "is misleading and is
likely to cause confusion and mistake, and to deceive the
public into believing falsely that defendants' web pages are
connected with and/or sponsored or authorized by Plain-
tiff."'76 This cause of action is based on the false designation
of origin under the federal unfair competition law.'
The complaint also alleged that the use of the plaintiffs
marks on defendants' web sites violate the new federal
trademark dilution act.'78 Oppedahl alleged that the mark
"Oppedahl & Larson" is likely to be considered famous and
that defendants used the mark for commercial use in intra-
state commerce.'79 Therefore, the defendants infringed upon
the plaintiffs mark.'80
174. Id.
175. Oppedahl & Larson v. Advanced Concepts, No. 97-CV-1592 (D. Colo.
Dec. 19, 1997).
176. Id. at line 36.
177. Id. at line 14-15.
178. See generally Oppedahl & Larson v. Advanced Concepts, No. 97-CV-
1592 (D. Colo. Dec. 19, 1997); Elizabeth Gardner, Trademark Battles Simmer
Behind Sites, WEBWEEK, Aug. 25, 1997, at 1, available at
<http://www.webweek.com/1997/08/25/news/19970825-battles.html>; David
Loundy, Hidden Code Sparks High-Profile Lawsuit, C.D.L.B. TECH. LAW
COLUMN, Sept. 11, 1997, at 2, available at
<http://www.loundy.com/CDLB/MetaTags.htm>; Sally M. Abel and Connie L.
Ellerbach, Trademark Issues in Cyberspace: The Brave New Frontier, Fenwick
& West LLP, Nov. 7, 1997, at 21, available at
<http://www.fenwick.com/pub/cyber.html>; Joe Salkowski, Tagging Their Prey,
Dispatches, Sept. 17, 1997, at 1-2, available at
<http://www.dispatches.azstarnet.com/features/meta.htm>; Jeff Pelline, Key-
words Said to Violate Trademark, THE NET, Aug. 27, 1997, at 1-3, available at
<http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,13799,00.html>.
179. Oppedahl & Larson v. Advanced Concepts, No. 97-CV-1592 (D. Colo.
Dec. 19, 1997).
180. Id.
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The United States District Court for the District of Colo-
rado ordered on Dec. 19, 1997, that for all defendants "the
Joint Motion for Entry of Final Judgment and Permanent
Injunction is granted, and Judgment is entered pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P 54(b)."'' The court ordered the defendants to
be permanently enjoined from using plaintiffs mark,
"Oppedahl & Larson," "in any 'meta tags' appearing on or in
web pages owned and/or operated by [defendants] without
authorization of plaintiff."18 2 Furthermore, the court ordered,
pursuant to the federal unfair competition false designation
of origin principles, that the defendants are permanently en-
joined from using the plaintiffs mark or the words
"Oppedahl" and "Larson" in web pages without the authori-
zation of the plaintiff.'83
3. Playboy v. Calvin Designer Label
Similar to the Insituform and Oppedahl cases, the plain-
tiff in Playboy v. Calvin Designer Label alleged that the in-
sertion of the plaintiffs registered trademarks of Playboy,
Playboy Magazine, and Playmate into the meta tag section of
the defendant's web site HTML coding constituted trademark
infringement.'84 Additionally, the complaint alleged that the
defendant's use of misleading terms in hidden text on the
web pages constituted passing off under unfair competition
principles.'85
The use of hidden text directly on the web page was ac-
complished by displaying the words Playboy, Playboy Maga-
zine, and Playmate in all black text on an all black back-
ground so the words would not be visible to a user, but would
trigger a search engine to pull up the site.88 "In fact, given
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, No. C-97-3204, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14346 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 1997) (temporary restraining or-
der), injunction granted, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14345 (Sept. 8, 1997). The de-
fendant's web sites are playboyxxx.com and playmatelive.com.
185. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, No. C-97-3204, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14346 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 1997) (temporary restraining or-
der), injunction granted, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14345 (Sept. 8, 1997). The de-
fendant's web sites are playboyxxx.com and playmatelive.com; see generally
Abel and Ellerbach, supra note 178, at 21; Salkowski, supra note 178, at 1-2.
186. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, No. C-97-3204, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14346 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 1997) (temporary restraining or-
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the number of times the terms appeared, the sites were typi-
cally the first or second sites to be returned [in a search]." 87
Following the principles of trademark and unfair compe-
tition, Playboy argued that these acts by the defendant con-
stituted an infringement based on trademark confusion.188
The complaint alleged that the defendant's acts "were under-
taken willfully and with the intention of causing confusion,
mistake or deception."'89 Additionally, Playboy argued that
these acts by the defendant constituted an infringement
based on false designation of origin and unfair competition. 9 '
The complaint alleged that purchasers and potential pur-
chasers of products bearing Playmate and Playboy trade-
marks are likely to be confused as to the source or origin of
the services rendered by the defendant.'9 ' This is because the
purchasers are likely to believe that the defendant's goods
and services originate from, are endorsed or are affiliated
with Playboy.9
On September 8, 1997, a preliminary injunction was is-
sued that precluded the defendant from using the play-
boyxxx.com and playmatelive.com domain names and the
trademarks Playboy and Playmate on those web sites.'93 Ad-
ditionally, the injunction also ordered defendant to immedi-
ately cancel their domain name registrations with NSI.9
The preliminary injunction was granted after the defendant
failed to file an appearance with the court. The case is cur-
rently pending.'9
der), injunction granted, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14345 (Sept. 8, 1997); see Salk-
owski, supra note 178, at 1-2.
187. See Abel and Ellerbach, supra note 178, at 21.
188. See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, No. C-97-3204,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14346 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 1997) (temporary restraining
order), injunction granted, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14345 (Sept. 8, 1997).
189. See id.
190. Id.
191. Id
192. Id. The Playboy web site is available at <http://www.playboy.com>.
193. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, No. C-97-3204, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14346 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 1997) (temporary restraining or-
der), injunction granted, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14345 (Sept. 8, 1997).
194. Id. NSI stands for Network Solutions Inc. A copy of the NSI's domain
name dispute policy can be found at its web site, <http://www.netsol.com/rs/nsi-
rev03.html>. Id.
195. Id.
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3. Playboy Enterprises v. AsiaFocus
In AsiaFocus, the plaintiff alleged that the use of the
"Playboy" and "Playmate" trademarks in meta tags, domain
names and web pages was infringing use of those trademarks
under the Lanham Act.9 The facts stated that the "Playboy"
and "Playmate" trademarks have become famous and have
developed significant good will and meaning, so that the
public has come to associate them with Playboy Enter-
prises.'97 The court concluded that the defendants' use di-
luted Playboy Enterprise's marks and that there was even
actual confusion by consumers."'
Importantly, the court held that the defendants' use of
the "Playboy" and "Playmate" trademarks in meta tags es-
tablished sufficient evidence that the defendants' use was
willful.9 '
[T]heir purposeful tactic of embedding the trademarks
PLAYMATE and PLAYBOY in the hidden computer
source code ... epitomizes the "blurring" of PEI's trade-
marks. When a search engine led a consumer to the
Asian-playmates web site in response to a search of PEI's
trademarks, the consumer would probably believe that the
defendants' web site was affiliated with PEI.
The significance of AsiaFocus is that when trademarks
are clearly famous and there is willful infringement, the de-
fendant will not only be enjoined from using the marks, but
in this case was also instructed to pay a three million dollar
award, attorneys' fees and court costs."' This is the first
trademark case that involved meta tag baiting where an ac-
tual fine was levied against the defendants. However, it is
unclear whether any one factor was more paramount than
another in deciding the amount of the fine. Therefore, it is
uncertain whether the use of the marks in the meta tags
alone would have been infringement or the factor that
stimulated the large damage award. °2
196. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. AsiaFocus International Incorporated, No.
97-734-A (E.D. Vir. April 10, 1998).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. AsiaFocus International Incorporated, No.
97-734-A (E.D. Vir. April 10, 1998).
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It is more likely that the prominent strength of the Play-
boy mark and the willful use throughout the web site, in-
cluding the meta tags, are the contributing factors for the
ruling of infringement and damages. However, the court did
specifically state that the element of willfulness was specifi-
cally evidenced by the defendants' use of the trademarks in
meta tags.2 °3
4. Playboy Enterprises v. Welles
One of the latest trademark meta tag cases to be decided
is Playboy Enterprises v. Terri Welles. °4 In Welles the plain-
tiff alleged that the insertion of the Playboy trademarks
"Playmate" and "Playboy" into the meta tag section of the de-
fendant's web site constituted an infringement under the
Lanham Act.2"5 The complaint alleged that this use is likely
to cause confusion, mistake, or deception as to the ownership
of those marks and the defendant's web site.0 6
Terri Welles is a former Playboy Playmate of the Year.
She uses her name and title, Playboy's 1981 Playmate of the
Year, on her web site pages and within the web page meta
tags.0 7 Furthermore, her web site includes disclaimers that
state, "This site is neither endorsed, nor sponsored by, nor af-
filiated with Playboy Enterprises, Inc. PLAYBOY,
PLAYMATE OF THE YEAR and PLAYMATE OF THE
MONTH are registered trademarks of Playboy Enterprises,
Inc." °8 Importantly, Playboy noted that this disclaimer use,
along with other terms within the keywords section of the
meta tags, triggers some search engines to index her site
with the Playboy trademarks. 9
The judge found that because "Welles had minimized her
references to Playboy on her web site and has not attempted
to trick consumers into believing that they are viewing a
Playboy-endorsed web site' . . . it is clear that defendant is
203. Id.
204. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, No. 98-CV-0413-K (JFS) (S.D. Cal.
1998).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, No. 98-CV-0413-K (JFS) (S.D. Cal.
1998).
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selling Terri Welles and only Terri Welles on the web site." 1'
Furthermore, because "she inserted disclaimers which clearly
state that the web site is not endorsed by PEI,""' the court
found that "[Welles'] use of the Playboy trademarks is de-
scriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe
[herself] .,213
With respect to the meta tags, the court found that there
is no trademark infringement where the defendant has used
the plaintiffs trademarks in good faith to index the content of
her web site.2"4 The court categorized her use of the Playboy
marks as an editorial indexing or fair use."' The judge
clearly felt that Welles' use of the Playboy trademarks in her
disclaimer is largely fair use and, therefore, eliminates any
confusion as to the ownership of such trademarks and Welles'
web site. 26 Therefore, the court refused to grant the injunc-
tion against Terri Welles and, consequently, this is the first
legal ruling supporting the use of trademarked terms in meta
tags.1 7
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM CAN TRADEMARK OR
UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW ADEQUATELY PROTECT A
TRADEMARK OWNER AGAINST SEARCH ENGINE BAITING WITH
HIS TRADEMARK?
The fundamental problem encountered when applying
trademark law to search engine trademark-baiting practices
is whether confusing a search engine is the same as confus-
ing a person or consumer. To put it another way, what does a
consumer expect when he or she types in search terms and
does the consumer associate those results with the trade-
marked terms they entered? Once the consumer selects one
of the web sites from the search engine index, do they still
associate the web page with the search term they entered?
Does this baiting practice confuse the consumer as to the
source of the goods or services and/or dilute the trademarked
211. See id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, No. 98-CV-0413-K (JFS) (S.D. Cal.
1998).
217. See id.
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good or service they were searching for?
Furthermore, assuming that courts determine that con-
fusing a search engine can amount to consumer confusion,
there are secondary problems: namely, whether trademark or
unfair competition law can adequately protect a trademark
owner against search engine baiting with his trademark.
These secondary problems are best illustrated by returning to
the Mythic Books Inc. hypothetical.218
One of the hypothetical web sites that uses the Mythic
Books trademark to bait search engines also includes a very
large and prominent disclaimer stating that his web page
was in no way affiliated, endorsed or sponsored by Mythic
Books Inc. The problem is that the disclaimer may remove
the element of consumer confusion and therefore it is unclear
what effect the disclaimer will have when trademark law is
applied.219
Another web site that uses Mythic to bait search engines
belongs to a Polish company selling "Mythic Sausages" who
has registered the trademark Mythic SausagesTM. The prob-
lem here is that this web site owner is not a bad actor and
that different classes of marks in geographically remote ar-
eas now conflict with each other on the Internet.
A third web site that uses Mythic to bait search engines
belongs to a ten year old boy who's last name is Mythic. The
boy does not use the web site for commercial purposes, but
only to display drawings and stories he creates. The problem
here is that the boy's use of the word Mythic is benign, non-
trademark use. Therefore, it is unclear if the owner of
Mythic Books Inc. could enjoin the boy's use of the word
Mythic on the boy's web site.
These hypothetical web sites illustrate the numerous
secondary problems that arise from applying trademark law
to the search engine-baiting problem. The courts have only
seen trademark-baiting practices that involve bad actors that
intentionally trick search engines to index their web sites
and benefit from using someone else's trademark. In the
cases where a bad actor is present the courts have begun to
enjoin such trademark practices and in one case awarded
218. See supra Part I.
219. See Loundy, supra note 178, at 2. A web site example is available at
<http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Lobby/6620/index.htm>.
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large damages, attorney fees and court fees."' However, it is
unclear how courts will treat benign trademark-baiting prac-
tices that involve registered trademarks from other trade-
mark classes or geographic regions and non-trademark or
non-commercial use. Although, if the Welles case is an ex-
ample of what is to come, it appears that benign use, descrip-
tive use and truthful use will not constitute infringement
when trademarks are used in meta tags.22' Therefore, the
trademark meta tag problems for web site owners may con-
tinue following this latest case. 2
IV. ANALYSIS: TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAWS
CURRENTLY Do NOT ADEQUATELY PROTECT A TRADEMARK
OWNER FROM SEARCH ENGINE BAITING PRACTICES WITH HIS
TRADEMARK
A. Fundamental Problem: Confuse a Search Engine, Not a
Consumer
Trademark search engine baiting does not involve the
same type of consumer confusion as the traditional types of
trademark and unfair competition infringements.2 3 'Unlike
traditional confusion, trademark-baiting confusion is not a
result of what the consumer sees, but what the consumer
does not see. 24 However, the consumer is still deceived and
misled from finding the trademark or web site they are
looking for. 5 The test for the confusion principle in trade-
mark law is whether the defendant's use of the plaintiffs
trademark is likely to cause an appreciable number of con-
sumers to be confused about the source, affiliation, or spon-
sorship of the goods or services associated with that trade-
220. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, No. C-97-3204, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14346 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 1997) (temporary restraining or-
der), injunction granted, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14345 (Sept. 8, 1997); Oppedahl
& Larson v. Advanced Concepts, No. 97-CV-1592 (D. Colo. Dec. 19, 1997); Insi-
tuform Technologies, Inc. v. National Envirotech Group LLC, No. 97-2064 (E.D.
La. Aug. 26, 1997); Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. AsiaFocus International Incor-
porated, No. 97-734-A (E.D. Vir. April 10, 1998).
221. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, No. 98-CV-0413-K (JFS) (S.D. Cal.
1998).
222. See id.
223. See supra Part II.B.2.
224. See supra Part II.A.
225. See supra Part II.A.
1998]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
mark.226
One problem applying the confusion principle to search
engine baiting is the difference in how the consumer is con-
fused. Traditional confusion arises when a consumer sees a
mark on goods or services that looks similar or is identical to
a trademark of another company's goods or services. The
consumer confuses the source of the goods.227 When a con-
sumer goes to a store to by Campbell's soup, they may see a
can with a mark, "Compbell's good stew." The consumer may
believe that this can is made by Campbell's Soup Company
because of its similar mark to the Campbell's can with the
Campbell's trademark. The key point is that the consumer
sees the marked product that has the confusingly similar or
exact trademark, and the consumer confuses the true source
of the product.
However, search engine baiting practices can appear to
confuse a consumer differently. Often, the consumer does not
see the trademark terms at all.228 A computer user searching
for Insituform Technologies Inc. typed in the trademark Insi-
tuform and arrived at a web site that "made no overt refer-
ence to Insituform Technologies or its trademarks."229 This
web site was a competitor of Insituform, and therefore proba-
bly offered similar types of goods and services that a con-
sumer would want.2"' But would a consumer confuse this web
site's goods and services with the Insituform trademark?
The relevant question in search engine baiting is "what
exactly is a consumer thinking in this situation?" If the con-
sumer links the web page's goods and services with the
trademarks that were searched for, then the consumer is con-
fused as to the source, affiliation, or sponsorship of those
goods and services.23' If the consumer recognizes that the
web page is not linked to the trademarks searched for, the
consumer can not have confusion as to the source, affiliation,
or sponsorship of the goods and services contained on that
226. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125.
227. See BARRETT, supra note 23, at 76-80; see SMEDINGHOFF, supra note 2,
at 209.
228. CL&L Successfully Stops a Competitor's New Form of Web site Unfair
Competition, Cowan, Leibowitz, & Latman, P.C., at 1, available at
<http://www.cll.com/wnewfr.htm>.
229. See id.
230. Id.
231. See supra Part II.B.3.
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web site. 32
In the former, the source of this confusion must come
from an assumption the consumer makes, because the site it-
self does not contain any visible forms of the trademark to
mislead him. The consumer would have to assume that the
web pages from the search results are necessarily affiliated
or sponsored by the trademark owners for confusion to ex-
ist.233 Whereas, in the latter, a consumer is likely to wonder
why the search results came up with that web page, but is
not likely to associate the trademarks searched for with the
web page.
The trademark confusion principle should apply to a
soup can mark just as it does to search engine baiting.2 34 Ba-
sically, a meta tag is the same as a trademark on a product.235
Trademarks on goods allow a consumer to determine the
source of a particular product. Meta tags within web pages
allow search engines, aided by a computer, to determine what
web sites contain a particular keyword or trademark.236
Therefore, using a confusingly similar or identical trade-
mark, whether in a meta tag or on a soup can, could cause a
consumer to be confused about the source, affiliation or spon-
sorship of the goods or services associated with that trade-
mark.
Therefore, the principle of trademark confusion applies
well to search engine baiting. In traditional cases the courts
have set up a number of factors to determine whether a de-
fendant's use of a mark is likely to confuse consumers as to
the source, affiliation, or sponsorship of his goods. 7 It ap-
pears that the courts could apply these same factors to a de-
fendant's trademark-baiting of a search engine to determine
232. See supra Part II.B.3.
233. A court has held that this type of consumer confusion can exist.
Teletech Customer Care Management (California), Inc. v. Tele-Tech Company,
1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 9590 (C.D. Cal. May 9, 1997). "Consumers and others
are likely to be confused by the Defendant's unauthorized use of "teletech.com"
as its domain name, because persons who attempt to locate the Plaintiffs web
site by typing in "teletech.com" as the domain name will instead be connected to
the Defendant's web site. While reading the Defendant's web site may dispel
this confusion, there is at least the initial confusion as to the source of the web
site that the user has accessed." See id.
234. See supra Part II.B.3.
235. See supra Part II.A.
236. See supra Part II.A.
237. See supra Part II.B.3.
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if a consumer is likely to be confused. '38
Insituform, Oppedahl, Calvin, and AsiaFocus illustrate
the willingness of courts to protect consumers from confusion
of the source of a product, based on trademark, dilution and
unfair competition principles when there is an intentional
bad act.239 When a plaintiffs trademark is used on a defen-
dant's web page in a manner that would likely confuse a con-
sumer or purchaser of goods as to the source of those goods,
the courts have begun to permanently enjoin and fine such
use."' Based on the outcome of the cases one could infer that
the courts determined that tricking a search engine through
trademark-baiting could lead to consumer confusion. The
courts' rationale in AsiaFocus explicitly states that trade-
mark use in meta tags did mislead consumers as to the own-
ership of the web site. '41
B. Secondary Problems
The courts have mainly seen cases involving bad actors
where confusion was likely. '42 However, the element of con-
fusion can be removed with a disclaimer.242 Furthermore,
there are many instances when a trademark can be used
properly to bait a search engine. The question in these in-
stances is whether the trademark owner should be able to
enjoin this arguably proper trademark use. The Welles case
is a example where the court held that the defendant was not
a bad actor and used the trademarks in a truthful and de-
scriptive manner with prominent disclaimers.2 4
238. See supra Part II.B.3.
239. See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, No. C-97-3204,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14346 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 1997) (temporary restraining
order), injunction granted, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14345 (Sept. 8, 1997);
Oppedahl & Larson v. Advanced Concepts, No. 97-CV-1592 (D. Colo. Dec. 19,
1997); Insituform Technologies, Inc. v. National Envirotech Group LLC, No. 97-
2064 (E.D. La. Aug. 26, 1997); Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. AsiaFocus Interna-
tional Incorporated, No. 97-734-A (E.D. Vir. April 10, 1998).
240. See cases cited supra note 239.
241. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. AsiaFocus International Incorporated, No.
97-734-A (E.D. Vir. April 10, 1998).
242. See supra Part II.
243. See the disclaimer web page available at
<http://www.geocities.com/capitolhill/lobby/6620/index.htm> and Playboy En-
terprises, Inc. v. Welles, No. 98-CV-0413-K (JFS) (S.D. Cal. 1998).
244. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, No. 98-CV-0413-K (JFS) (S.D. Cal.
1998).
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1. Disclaimer Use Can Eliminate Trademark Confusion
Disclaimers in trademark law are statements made to
clarify, repudiate, and disassociate a connection between the
labeled product and another product or source.245 Usually
disclaimers are not held to eliminate the likelihood for con-
sumer confusion when placed on products.246 This is because
typically the disclaimer is so small that its effect in reducing
consumer confusion is questionable.247 However, if the label
is so conspicuous that consumers are bound to see it, then a
court may be less skeptical to its effect.248
The principle of disclaimers at first glance appears to
apply well to search engine trademark-baiting practices.
However, the structure of the Internet makes it more difficult
to apply disclaimers to search engine baiting.249
Shortly after an article discussing the Oppedahl case was
published in Webweek, a web site was created to illustrate
the rights web owners have when it comes to trademark and
unfair competition law. 5° Based on principles of fair use,
parodies, and lack of confusion, a web owner has posted a site
that at the risk of looking silly, says nothing except that the
site has nothing to do with Carl Oppedahl or Oppedahl &
Larson.25' It is quite easy for a web owner to place a large,
conspicuous disclaimer on his web page. The page includes
disclaimers stating that the web site is in no way affiliated,
sponsored, or approved by Oppedahl & Larson."' Not sur-
prisingly, because of all the uses of the words Oppedahl &
Larson, the site is displayed quite high up on web search re-
sults for the words Oppedahl & Larson.253 This illustrates
the problem with current trademark law. An owner of a non-
famous trademark must show confusion of source to enjoin
such trademark use. However, disclaimers remove the ele-
ment of consumer confusion, which eliminates a trademark
245. See BARRETT, supra note 23, at 105.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See supra Part II.A.
250. See Loundy, supra note 178, at 2. A web site example is available at
<http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Lobby/6620/index.htm>.
251. See Loundy, supra note 178, at 2.
252. Id.
253. See search on "Oppedahl & Larson" available at
<http://www.altavista.com>.
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owner's cause of action, while at the same time the dis-
claimer words continue to trigger the search engines to
falsely index the web site.254
So with the no consumer confusion, where is the dam-
age? The damage occurs because a trademark owners web
site will not be on the top of the search engine index.255 Many
consumers read the first few displays on a search engine in-
dex and either find what they are looking for or look for
something else.25 Therefore, the trademark owners web site
may receive less visits because the web site is not as high up
on the search engine index. For some web sites, this loss of
257visits is where the real damage occurs.
For example, a consumer looking for the Playboy web
page would get all the web sites that a search engine has in-
dexed based on the number of times the trademark Playboy
occurs on them.2 8 Webmasters that bait their web pages use
these key words in the meta tags and background text so
many times that their sites come up in the results before the
actual Playboy site does .29  The disclaimer on the competing
web site is handy for the consumer, alerting them that yet
again, this site in the search results is not what they are
looking for. In effect, the other web sites have hidden the
playboy web site from the consumer by moving ahead of the
Playboy web site on the search engine index, or by compari-
son, moving it to the back of the supermarket shelf. ' ° There-
fore, although actual disclaimers can be quite effective to
eliminate confusion on web pages, the use of disclaimers
would create a loophole that would allow many webmasters
to use someone else's trademarks to steer consumers toward
their web site and away from the trademark owner's web
site.26'
254. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, No. 98-CV-0413-K (JFS) (S.D. Cal.
1998).
255. See supra Part II.A.
256. See supra Part II.A.
257. See Loundy, supra note 178, at 2
258. The address for Playboy is at <http://www.playboy.com>. See supra
Part II.A.
259. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, No. C-97-3204, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14346 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 1997) (temporary restraining or-
der), injunction granted, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14345 (Sept. 8, 1997).
260. See Loundy, supra note 178, at 2.
261. See supra Part IV.A.3.; see Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, No. 98-
CV-0413-K (JFS) (S.D. Cal. 1998).
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2. Valid Trademark Use in Another Class or Geographic
Region Could Allow Search Engine Baiting
Two owners can own the same trademark if their goods
or services are in different trademark classes.262 This poses a
unique problem on the Internet because search engines do
not index web sites based on the different trademark
classes.263 Arguably, both owners could bait search engines
with their registered trademarks and neither owner would be
doing anything wrong.264 However, this benign use could lead
a consumer to confuse the source of the goods or services on
one web page with those goods or services of another com-
pany and could lead to a loss of visits on one of the web
sites.265
Returning to the hypothetical, a consumer looking for
Mythic Books' web page could be led to Mythic Sausages' web
page. Furthermore, the consumer could confuse the goods of-
fered on Mythic Sausages' web page as being affiliated with
Mythic Books or vice versa. Should a court determine that no
consumer confusion exists due to the different trademark
classes or because of a prominent disclaimer on the web site,
Mythic Books may not be able to enjoin Mythic Sausages
from baiting search engines with the Mythic trademark.
Therefore, the trademark class system may allow many
262. This assumes neither mark is famous. See supra Part II.B.2.
263. See supra Part II.A.
264. Two cases illustrating this trademark class problem on the Internet in-
volve domain names and not baiting but they represent the heart of the prob-
lem. One case is the dispute between the computer manufacturer Philip Gia-
calone and the stuffed toys manufacturer Ty, Inc. Giacalone had registered the
domain name ty.com for his web site with the designation "Tech Yard," and of-
fered his services directly on the Internet. After Ty, Inc. gave notice of its reg-
istered mark "ty" to NSI, the domain name was placed on "hold" by NSI. Gia-
calone filed suit against Ty, Inc. and NSI; in preliminary proceedings, NSI was
ordered to re-instate the domain name for Giacalone, U.S. District Court N.D.
California, May 30, 1996, Giacalone v. Network Solutions, Inc. et al, Civil
Docket No. 96-20434. The second case is cited by Sutherlin Dueker,
"Trademark Law Lost in Cyberspace: Trademark Protection for Internet Ad-
dresses," 9 HARV. J. L. & TECH., No. 2, at 484, 494 (1996). In this case the At-
lantic Richfield Company had always used its entire company name in commer-
cial transactions. When the company set up a web site in the Internet under
the domain name arco.com it was sued by Arco Publishing, a firm active in a
different branch of trade. Atlantic Richfield contested that registration of the
entire company name would not have been possible due to the limitation of do-
main names to 24 letters.
265. See supra Part IV.A.1. for a discussion of where the real damage occurs
is in the loss of visits if no confusion exists.
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webmasters to use trademarks to bait search engines to the
detriment of the other trademark owners.
Two owners can own the same trademark if their goods
or services are in geographically separate or geographically
remote areas."' The Internet as a business model creates a
large problem for owners of identical trademarks because the
Internet combines these remote areas into one community.
This problem arises because search engines do not necessar-
ily index web pages based on geographic region."' Webmas-
ters are not required to register their web site under any spe-
cific top level domain (TLD) name that could identify at least
the country of origin.268
Within the United States this conflict has traditionally
been resolved traditionally by determining which owner was
first in time to register the trademark. '69 However, this
resolution would not work with the Internet. There are thou-
sands of stores in small remote towns across the country with
the same name. It would be simply impractical to require all
but one to change their trademarks simply because they
want a web page. Therefore, it is unlikely that a trademark
owner could enjoin a geographically remote owner's use of the
same trademark to bait search engines unless the trademark
is famous.
3. Non-Trademark or Fair Use Could Allow Search
Engine Baiting
The trademark system has another problem on the In-
ternet. Since trademark classes are not indexed separately
on the Internet, there is no way to separate generic or non-
trademark use of a trademark. For example, if a computer
user is searching for the new music rock band, Cake, they
could arrive at Just Desserts' web site, which sells cake reci-
pes. This illustrates that even non-trademark use could
cause a search engine to index a web site. Therefore, the
owner of a generic trademark may not be able to enjoin
search engine baiting when the term is generic. Further, de-
scriptive and fair use of a trademark can lead to similar
266. This assumes neither mark is famous. See supra Part II.B.2.
267. See supra Part II.A.
268. Some TLD names are .com, .edu, .org, but also, .uk, .jp, which stand for
United Kingdom and Japan.
269. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 95, § 26.00 et seq.
278 [Vol. 39
DETERING BAITING PRACTICES
problems. Looking at the Welles case, the court held that the
use of the "Playboy of the Month '81" expression was a fair
and descriptive use by the defendant, Terri Welles.27°
Turning again to the Mythic Books hypothetical, it does
not appear likely that Mythic Books could enjoin the ten year
old boy from baiting search engines with the boys last name,
Mythic. 271 The mere reference of the word Mythic when the
web site is not for commercial purposes is not likely to create
consumer confusion.272 Furthermore, the boy arguably has a
first amendment right to use his name to cause search en-
gines to index his web site.
4. Trademark Dilution Offers Limited Protection Against
Search Engine Baiting
The federal trademark dilution statute is designed to
provide protection against a gradual whittling away of the
distinctiveness or unique character of a mark, protection of
the selling power of a distinctive mark, or protection against
blurring of a distinct mental image.2 73 A typical dilution case
involves a non-confusing use of a famous mark on unrelated
goods or services that is found to dilute the distinctive quality
of the famous mark.274 Therefore, it appears that one benefit
of this principle is that it does not require consumer confu-
271
sion. However, this statute only protects trademarks that
are determined to be famous marks.276
One problem with applying federal dilution principles to
search engine baiting with trademarks is determining if the
plaintiffs trademark is famous. If the mark is not famous, it
is not entitled to protection under this statute.277 One recent
example of a mark that enjoys dilution protection because it
has been held famous is the "Playboy" mark. Very few
270. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, No. 98-CV-0413-K (JFS) (S.D. Cal.
1998).
271. See supra Part III.
272. See generally Domain Name Dispute With a Twist: Pokey.org, available
at http://www.callaw.com/stories/edt0330b.html. (A young boy whose nickname
is Pokey uses the web site for non-commercial purposes and Prema Toys Inc.
wants that web site name). See id.
273. See supra Part II.B.5.
274. Id.
275. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125.c.
276. See id.
277. Id.
278. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. AsiaFocus International Incorporated, No.
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trademarks are considered famous,279 even though the
chances are better on the Internet that a webmaster would
use famous marks, this factor does not provide much protec-
tion for most trademarks. Since Mythic Books is a new com-
pany, it is unlikely that Mythic Books is a famous mark and
therefore, it could not enjoin trademark use based on dilu-
tion. Furthermore, to get protection under the dilution stat-
ute, the use must be commercial and, 8' therefore, the statute
does not offer broad trademark protection.
5. Passing Off May Offer Some Protection Against
Search Engine Baiting
False designation of origin, or "Passing Off," is based on
the same principle as trademark confusion.28' The test is
whether the defendants use of a similar mark is likely to
cause consumers to believe that the defendant's business
goods or services come from or are sponsored or affiliated
with the plaintiff.282 However, the principle of passing off
looks at the total impression the defendant created through a
combination of marketing elements, while in trademark in-
fringement claims, only the impression made by the allegedly
infringing trademark itself is looked at. 8' Therefore,
"passing off' is a broader principle by which one may seek
protection of one's trademark.
The principle of "passing off' appears to apply well to
search engine baiting with trademarks. In light of the prob-
lem with trademark law and the loophole disclaimers create
when used on web sites, the broadness of "passing off' makes
this an important principle to consider. 84 The "passing off"
principle focuses more on the whole picture the defendant
creates by using the plaintiffs trademarks to bait search en-
gines.28 Therefore, the damage to the trademark owner from
tricking search engines by trademark-baiting is more likely
97-734-A (E.D. Vir. April 10, 1998)
279. Typically a mark must be used for at least ten years to become famous.
See generally Gateway 2000, Inc. v. Gateway.Com, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2144 (Feb. 6, 1997).
280. See supra Part II.B.5.
281. See BARRETT, supra note 23, at 124.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 125.
284. See supra Part II.C.2.
285. See BARRETT, supra note 23, at 125.
280 [Vol. 39
DETERING BAITING PRACTICES
to be viewed as infringement under the "passing off' princi-
ple.2"6 The advantage to the passing off principle is that it
looks at the whole picture. However, it is likely that passing
off would only provide added protection in cases where the
webmaster uses a disclaimer to use someone else's trade-
marks."27
6. False Advertising May Offer Some Protection Against
Search Engine Baiting
One problem with applying false advertising principles to
search engine baiting is determining if the use of trademark
meta tags is advertising. "Advertising may generally be de-
fined as any action intended to draw the attention of the
public to a product, service, person or organization. " "'s Meta
tags are instructions or lists of keywords, placed in the
HTML language of the web site to help a search engine index
web sites with those keywords.289 Notice, it does not appear
the consumer must see the meta tag, only that the "action is
intended to draw the attention" of the consumer."' There-
fore, it is likely that placing trademarks in meta tags is ad-
vertising.
Another problem with applying false advertising princi-
ples to search engine baiting is determining if the defendant's
use of trademarked meta tags is a false or misleading state-
ment about its own product. So the first question is whether
a meta tag is a statement about the defendant's product. Be-
cause some web sites are indexed and displayed based on
consumer search keywords contained in meta tags, a web site
represents that it contains something about those keywords.
Ideally, keyword meta tags would be truthful locators defin-
ing the product or content of the web site. Therefore, it is
possible to construe a meta tag as a statement about a web
site.
However, the next question is whether that statement in
the meta tag is false and misleading. The defendant's prod-
ucts in the Insituform, Oppedahl, and Calvin cases had
286. See 15 U.S.C. 1125.
287. See supra Part IV.B.1.
288. See SMEDINGHOFF, supra note 2, at 350.
289. See Loundy, supra note 178, at 1.
290. See SMEDINGHOFF, supra note 2, at 350.
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nothing to do with the trademarked meta tags they used.29'
The meta tags misled the consumer and search engine into
believing that the defendant's web site would have the char-
acteristics or qualities of the trademarked search term.292
The AsiaFocus court held that using trademarks in meta tags
is misleading. 92 Since it appears that meta tags could be
considered a form of misleading advertising, false advertising
principles apply well to the search engine baiting problem.
However, these principles are limited to cases where there is
a product on the web site, or affirmative advertising. There-
fore, the false advertising principle could only offer limited
protection for a trademark owner seeking to enjoin search
engine baiting practices with his trademark.
V. CONCLUSION: NO ADEQUATE PROTECTION OF TRADEMARKS
FROM SEARCH ENGINE BAITING
To date, courts enjoin search engine baiting with trade-
marks only when there is an intentional bad act.294 Through
the principles of unfair competition courts may begin to en-
join search engine baiting with trademarks even when dis-
claimers are used.299 Furthermore, trademarks that are fa-
mous are likely to be protected with trademark dilution.96
However, under Welles, a famous mark was not protected
when it was used in meta tags in a descriptive, fair manner
with disclaimers.297 Therefore, the extent of protection a
trademark owner receives on the Internet may be limited to
cases where bad actors use a trademark that they clearly do
not have the rights to use.
When a trademark is used on a web site in a benign or
fair manner to bait search engines the owner of the trade-
291. See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Calvin Designer Label, No. C-97-3204,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14346 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 1997) (temporary restraining
order), injunction granted, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14345 (Sept. 8, 1997);
Oppedahl & Larson v. Advanced Concepts, No. 97-CV-1592 (D. Colo. Dec. 19,
1997); Insituform Technologies, Inc. v. National Envirotech Group LLC, No. 97-
2064 (E.D. La. Aug. 26, 1997);
292. See cases supra note 291.
293. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. AsiaFocus International Incorporated, No.
97-734-A (E.D. Vir. April 10, 1998).
294. See supra Part II.D.
295. See supra Part IV.B.1.
296. See supra Part IV.B.4.
297. Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Welles, No. 98-CV-0413-K (JFS) (S.D. Cal.
1998).
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mark may not have a remedy against this use of his trade-
mark. It appears that trademark and unfair competition law
do not prohibit search engine baiting with trademarks when
the same trademark is owed by another person for a different
class of goods or services. 298  Additionally, protection is
equally uncertain when another person in a geographically
remote area owns the same trademark.299 Finally, it appears
that trademark and unfair competition law may not prohibit
search engine baiting with trademarks when the trademark
is generic or the use is non-trademark or fair use."' There-
fore, in order to clarify the potential consumer confusion with
this benign trademark use, and to provide trademark owners
with a remedy against such use, trademark law should be
amended to regulate search engine baiting with trademarks.
VI. PROPOSAL: AMEND TRADEMARK LAW TO REGULATE
SEARCH ENGINE BAITING.
This comment proposes that courts should continue to
follow the rulings in Insituform, Oppedahl, Calvin and
AsiaFocus and enjoin and fine trademark use for search en-
gine baiting when bad actors are involved. 30' Additionally, a
system should be established that would incorporate unfair
competition and trademark law with Internet search engine
use. This system would apply the current trademark, and
unfair competition laws to the Internet so that trademark
"baiting" practices can be clarified and properly resolved.
The new trademark system should begin by regulating
keyword meta tag use. The keyword meta tag would be lim-
ited to trademark classifications, trademarks and geographic
locations. A webmaster would only represent the truthful at-
tributes of the web site in this meta tag based on the previ-
ous elements. Following trademark law, if a trademark is
used in the keyword meta tag that misrepresents the web
site or trademark, the web site use of the trademark would
be enjoined by the trademark owner. This system would al-
low search engines the ability to rely on keyword meta tags
to index web sites. Therefore, the indexes generated by
298. See supra Part IV.B.2.
299. See supra Part IV.B.2.
300. See supra Part IV.B.3.
301. See cases cited supra note 220.
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search engines would contain the trademark, the class of
goods or services and the geographic location of the goods or
services. This would eliminate most of the consumer confu-
sion regarding the trademark source, and allow most web
sites to be indexed accurately.
There are many benefits to this proposed keyword meta
tag regulation. As the requirement becomes more widely ac-
cepted, it will create dialogue between web owners and
trademark owners. More importantly, this requirement es-
tablishes a benchmark for meta tag use so new web sites will
know the boundaries of the law. This works preemptively to
avoid future conflicts between trademark owner and web site
owner and encourages "netiquette." °2
However, the keyword meta tag regulation will not solve
the entire problem. Similar or identical trademarks in other
classes or geographic areas will still come up in search engine
indexes. This problem may be addressed by increasing the
use of the top level country domain names or by other self
help remedies. For example, owners of the same trademarks
should agree to cross-link each other's web sites to help the
consumer get to the web site they are looking for. Of course,
this will not work in every case of the variability in the con-
tent of different web sites and the variability in owner pref-
erences.
To resolve the class or geographic area problem, the use
of the description meta tag should be regulated in addition to
the keyword meta tag."3 The description meta tag should in-
clude a brief synopsis of the goods or services and the
webmaster should be prohibited from using non-generic
trademarks in this meta tag. This would eliminate most of
the confusion as to the source of the goods or services when
the consumer looks at the search engine index and would re-
duce the use of trademarked terms in meta tags, therefore
increasing the predictability of searching based on trade-
marked terms.
Further, this proposal encourages the expansion of tech-
nological methods to clarify and streamline web searches.
WC3 and P3P are current groups that focus on privacy con-
302. "Netiquette dictates that other web sites be told when you plan to link
to them, links to other web sites be removed if the linkee objects" (available at
<http://www.benedict.com/webiss.htm>). See supra Part II.B.3.
303. For a discussion on what these tags are, see supra Part II.A.
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cerns by encoding meta tags. It is entirely possible that this
same technology could be used to index and differentiate be-
tween trademark classes, uses and owners on web based
searches.
The practical effect of regulating the keyword and de-
scription meta tags is that web site searches based on trade-
mark terms may become more predictable and, therefore, re-
liable. This will allow webmasters to use their trademarks to
bait search engines as long as the class, geographic origin
and description of the goods or services are included in the
respective meta tags. This policy would strictly prohibit the
use of someone else's trademarks.
Applying this proposal to the hypothetical book selling
business, Mythic Books Inc., it appears that Mythic Books
Inc. has a remedy against some of the other web sites. The
web sites that use the Mythic Books mark in meta tags and
background keyword text are clearly infringing on the Mythic
Books trademark. More importantly, it appears the web sites
using Mythic Books in meta tags and also using disclaimers
would still be infringing on the trademark. Mythic Books'
remedies against trademark meta tag baiting include licens-
ing the use, enjoining the use, collecting the damages for lost
profits, and, in an exceptional case, even treble damages and
costs."' However, consistent with this proposal, it is always
better to ask to remove the meta tags that have the trade-
mark in them first and sue later.
Mythic Books would not be able to enjoin the sausage
company or the ten-year-old boy, and they probably would
not want to either."' With the new regulation in place, a
consumer would be better able to search for Mythic Books
and locate it on the index. Additionally, Mythic Books could
enter into cross-link agreements with other web sites, such
as the sausage company or the ten-year-old boy, which may
validly use the trademark Mythic.
Scott Shipman
304. See supra Part II.B.4.
305. Often the Internet can create more bad press than the problem is
worth. See Domain Name Dispute With a Twist: Pokey.org, available at
<http://www.callaw.com/stories/edt0330b.html>.
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